A retired marine gunnery sergeant, Newman fought defensive operations against guerrillas in the Philippines as a member of the Marine special forces in the 1970s and ’80s and saw combat in the gulf war of 1991. Since returning to civilian life, the 20-year veteran has made a name for himself as an expert on guerrilla warfare by being invited to testify before Congress and writing several books on the topic, including 1997’s “Guerrillas in the Mist: A Battlefield Guide to Clandestine Warfare” (Palidan Press). Newman spoke with NEWSWEEK’s Adam Piore about the dangers facing U.S. soldiers in Iraq–and how they should be trained to counter them.

NEWSWEEK: You’ve described the current situation in Iraq as a classic guerrilla war? Why?

Newman: It’s classic because these [fighters] are remnants of an overthrown regime. You can’t kill them all. And if they feel they still have a chance at winning, they will resort to guerrilla war. Now they are becoming better organized and better financed. They’re becoming more brazen. Notice that most of the ambushes are hit and run. Somebody fires a rocket-propelled grenade, and by the time the soldiers get oriented the guy could be on a motorcycle, gone. That’s a classic guerrilla tactic: attack and break contact immediately. They hide in plain sight.

How will this be affected by last week’s killing of Uday and Qusay Hussein?

The deaths of Uday and Qusay will primarily result in additional intelligence being provided by sources who were too fearful to come forward when they were alive.

Are the U.S. forces doing a good job fighting against the Iraqi insurgents?

One of very first things you have got to do in a counterguerrilla scenario is personal and small-unit security. This has been a problem for us. For example, [on July 6] we had the soldier who walked away from his unit to go in to Baghdad University to buy a Coke, and he got shot in the head. He was alone and therefore could not defend himself in a 360-degree perimeter. Had he had at least one of his buddies with him, they could have stood in the line back to back with weapons at the ready and that soldier would not have been shot.

Any other examples?

We had the soldier who was looking at DVD discs in a small store. It was the same situation. He got shot, too. You can’t be walking around alone. The soldiers in the Third Infantry Division are not ready to handle an immediate tactical situation. Just the other day, there was a picture in the newspaper of a dead soldier. All these other soldiers were standing around in a cluster and not one of them had a weapon at the ready. One grenade could have put them all to ground. It’s very troubling, and this is a problem with small-unit leadership. It’s just awful tactics.

What should the U.S. military be doing?

If you want a successful example, back in 1940s and 1950s there’s the British experience in Malaya. They sent in special-operations forces who fought like guerrillas themselves. They went after command and control and supply lines and literally choked them out. They took out leadership, took out supplies and by doing so they took away the tactical advantage of guerrillas and they won. We could do that. But you have to have the right forces in there. What you have to do is put in lots more special-operations forces–Navy Seals, Marines–who are trained to fight like guerrillas and are perfectly willing and capable of fighting on a guerrilla’s level. You have to hunt the enemy and make him so afraid of you that he dares not raise his head because you will put a bullet right between his eyes.

Do these guerrillas appear well trained or are they just taking advantage of random targets?

The attacks to date reflect enough training to get the job done insofar as individual attack effectiveness goes, but the attacks have not had the effect of driving out U.S. forces, which is the enemy’s goal. Nor have the attacks seemed to weaken President Bush’s resolve. So, tactically, yes, the hits are generally well done. But strategically, they are having little effect.

What does this say about their training?

When it comes to training, the attacks are being carried out in the best way possible: simply. An RPG nails a Hummer, followed by some brief automatic-weapons fire in some cases. A soldier on guard duty gets sniped. Some soldiers playing cards who did not put out security to cover them get a frag dropped on them. These are classic hits that work because they are simple. Some are targets of opportunity and others are planned because of known avenues of approach and defensive positions.

All you need is a little cover and concealment. And they’re being very brazen with handguns. They walk up, shoot a guy in the head, hide the gun beneath robes and then blend in with crowd. Of course the crowds are not going to point them out, because whoever did it will have to worry about retribution to family. Part of the guerrilla strategy is to make the population very afraid of retribution.

What about the effect on morale?

Some folks in the media would love to have you believe that the Third Infantry Division is completely demoralized. Some soldiers in the unit are demoralized. When you have soldiers who say “if [Secretary of Defense] Donald Rumsfeld were here I’d ask for his resignation,” it increases the combat power of the enemy, because they watch TV and they say, “look we’re making progress.” So they beef up the attacks.

That soldier [who made those comments] violated three articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice–contempt toward an official, aiding the enemy and making disloyal statements. That soldier should be immediately court martialed and removed from the battlefield. Because he is like a cancer, he is a danger to his fellow soldiers and the NCOs in immediate charge of him should be relieved. It’s their responsibility.

Would you compare the current situation in Iraq to any other conflict?

The closest one would be Afghanistan.

Could the Iraqi guerrillas actually win?

Any guerrilla force has the potential to win. Will this one win? No. Because we will use overwhelming forces over a period of time. We can’t walk away. We’re an instant society, we want problems solved right away. [But] we’ve got to understand that we’re going to be there for two to five years.